A Different Angle on No Deal versus a Bad Deal

Is there anything about the Brexit negotiations that gets people's backs up so much as the suggestion from anyone remotely connected to the UK government that it would be better not to have a deal at all than to have a bad deal?

And yet how many people have considered the possibility that that might be pretty much the EU's own negotiating position?

The situation prior to the referendum was actually not far from being optimal for the EU: ok, the UK wasn't in the Eurozone nor part of Schengen, but there was substantial trade balance in favour of EU27 countries, the UK provided a large number of employment opportunities for EU citizens, with remittances to support families left behind in the countries of origin, and what's more the UK paid handsomely for the privilege of being in the EU.

From the EU's point of view, therefore, any change is to the EU's detriment, so that is why Brexit cannot be a success.

No-one can argue that the EU position has been anything other than consistent and clear from the outset: in order to get any sort of deal, the UK will have to settle its accounts according to the EU's own interpretation of what the UK's liabilities are, and the UK will have submit to the authority of the ECJ on citizen's rights.

The EU might calculate that the political situation in the UK means that there is only a small risk of such a deal being rejected, but even if the UK government summons the courage to do so, the EU would be reasonably happy to trade with the UK under WTO terms.  They anticipate that we will lower tariffs on 3rd party countries, allowing the EU to take advantage of MFN (most favoured nation) and TBT (technical barriers to trade) rules, without having any need to reciprocate itself. EU importers would have to start paying tariffs, but adjustments to the GBP to Euro exchange rate would likely cancel out most of the effects, and so the total cost of the goods to the EU customers will remain relatively unchanged, with the EU benefiting from the income from import taxes in the process.

The EU would accept reduced exports to the UK as a price worth paying to maintain the integrity of single market, and besides it would be another beneficial crisis to drive further EU integration. They know that there is always the possibility of a trade deal in the future, should circumstances take an unexpected turn, such as exports to the UK collapsing. And they can always blame the British for anything that goes wrong.

This leaves only 2 possible outcomes: No Deal, or acceptance of EU terms with a Norwegian-style arrangement, the latter being a personal humiliation not just for Theresa May, but also for David Davis and Boris Johnson. Those who say we should call the EU's bluff in order to get a better deal have missed the point: they are not bluffing. Looking at it in that light, the PM's Florence offer makes sense - if No Deal is to be a realistic option, the UK needs time to prepare.

You could say that the UK therefore has to do a cost-benefit analysis in order to work out whether it is worth paying the settlement to minimise medium-term disruption, but the trouble is, there are too many unknowns to take into account to be able to do so with any level of confidence.

In my view, the decision will therefore boil down to politics - which option is least likely to result in defeat for the Government at the next election? Safety-first at a substantial price, or a gamble that might pay off handsomely in the long term provided that the Marxists can be kept out of Downing Street?

Reflections one year after the EU Referendum

Below is taken from a tweet storm by Roland Smith, which he invited me to write up, me having expressed the hope that it would be published and read more widely — not that that’s going to be achieved by me publishing it on my own modest blog!

There was always one thing at the root of Euroscepticism: the democracy argument, that the connection between the Government and governed had been blurred. That argument is split into two:

(1) The EU’s existence and modus operandi neutered UK democracy by the direct effect of laws, and by majority voting. This first aspect of the democracy argument has been rehearsed at length many times. It focuses on the shortcomings of the EU itself.
(2) The second part of the democracy argument is that UK politics is itself at fault. It took us into EU and outsourced its functions; then didn’t renew the EU mandate, as became necessary at the time of Maastricht, Lisbon, and the years in between and beyond.

UK politics infantilised itself during this process, gradually descending into empty slogan politics and losing respect along the way. The pro-EU side in the UK, leading this descent, has constantly sold EU membership as something it isn’t: namely economic and transactional, playing down the EU’s influence and reach over years. “It’s only the size of the BBC or Scottish office; few laws come from there”.

Euroscepticism’s case that “we’ve been lied to for years about EU” is entirely valid, but it’s generally not the EU that did the lying. This second aspect of the democracy argument is rarely heard these days because Leave figureheads are themselves politicians, and because Leave politics has itself been drawn into the infantilisation process, led down by the Ukipification of British Euroscepticism.

So the EU Referendum was a battle of SW1 infants. But at least this was surfaced for all to see. The uselessness of SW1 is still illustrated daily.

Also revealed by the EU Referendum (as Remain Ultras ironically sneer) is how hugely integrated into the EU we’ve become, close to point of no exit. Euroscepticism’s longstanding case of being lied to, and the UK being massively integrated, is seemingly proven.

Meanwhile the Remain lobby still sing the old song of economics and a transactional relationship, quietly wondering why it isn’t working. And the relatively recently infantilised Leave movement just wants it all sorted NOW (as infants do) and without serious engagement.

‘Free movement’ is illustrative. The EU locks down a part of UK immigration debate BUT various UK Govts also failed to do what they can. In this sense, Farage has been Westminster’s useful idiot, putting the entire blame for uncontrolled immigration” on the EU.

So Voters in the general election sent an aggregated message to SW1 saying “A plague on all your houses”. And who can blame them?

What the election outcome demands is a more considered approach to Brexit from all parties. Yet they now seem incapable of stepping up.

The bottom line: the rot must be stopped the Government made fully accountable to the governed. That starts with Brexit — howsoever long it takes.

An Enlightened Party for Scotland?

I am not Scottish. I don't even (as far as I know, and I have traced most of my great-great grandparents) have any Scottish ancestors. I have only visited Scotland on a handful of occasions, and to be honest found it to be almost like a foreign country.

And yet for some mysterious reason I have found that I have a great deal of affinity for Scottish people - I have a number of Scottish friends, and a number of the writers I most admire are Scottish, such as Iain Martin, Fraser Nelson, and Graeme Archer, to name just a few. Indeed, during the Independence referendum campaign I became passionate in the cause of unionism, actively supporting my Facebook friends with by posting articles supporting a No vote (quite whether that was actually effective or not I have no idea!).

Ever since the Brexit referendum, however, I have become increasingly uneasy about Scottish Independence. As an ardent Brexiteer, how can I not have sympathy for those who seek self-determination? This is pretty much summed up by this article:

http://blogs.spectator.co.uk/2017/03/hypocrisy-pro-union-brexiteers/

Unfortunately, however, the sort of independence envisaged by the SNP is likely to be disastrous.

Perhaps what is needed is a new party to champion an enlightened form of Scottish Independence in opposition to the SNP.

My suggestions for policies to set it apart from the SNP would be:

• Free market economics and sound money
• Pro-Brexit
• Pro-CANZUK
• Close cooperation with England, especially on trade 
• Common UK defence, including nuclear deterrent

The free market economic policies would be tempered with Scottish social responsibility, along the lines of the views of the late Michael Novak, which are a natural development of the ideas of the great Scottish father of:economics, Adam Smith:

https://capx.co/the-capitalist-who-knew-capitalism-was-only-a-third-of-what-we-need/

An independent Scotland should seek a leadership position within any future CANZUK union: the Scots were after all at the forefront of the settling of Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and apparently more inhabitants of Canada self-identify as Scottish than do inhabitants of Scotland itself! What would be a more natural capital for a CANZUK union than Edinburgh?

These policies would not only allow independent Scotland to thrive, but also not diminish the rest of the UK.

A party based on this platform would draw inspiration from the great figures of the Scottish Enlightenment itself. Indeed - why not call it the Scottish Enlightenment Party?

The trouble is, though, as I said at the beginning, I am not Scottish: who is going to listen to me?

What Britain Wants: Globalism, Nationalism, Brexit & Grayson Perry

My cousin, who is strongly on the Remain side of the argument, suggested to me that we both take part in Grayson Perry's What Britain Wants project:

http://www.channel4.com/programmes/grayson-perrys-dream-house/articles/all/grayson-perry-what-britain-wants/5037

Grayson will be making 2 pots, one to represent the 52% who voted Leave, and the other, slightly smaller (presumbly 92.7% of the size of the Leave Pot), to represent the 48% who voted Remain. He is planning to put photos of people plus their opinions on the appropriate pot.

I was wondering what I would want to say, so first I want to take a step back an examine the issues afresh.

It is generally accepted that identity was a major factor in the way that people voted at the EU referendum, as outlined by Andrew Lilico:

http://reaction.life/world-needs-britain-today-ever/

Similarly, many of those who voted Remain did so based on their perception of their own identity: they saw themselves are enlightened cosmopolitan internationalists, and detested the thought of the UK retreating and pulling up the drawbridge; they particularly disliked Nigel Farage and his followers, and frankly who can blame them?

A more profound explanation of the basis of these identities can be found in the work of Professor Jonathan Haidt, who explains the divide between Globalism and Nationalism in a couple of excellent essays:

http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/07/10/when-and-why-nationalism-beats-globalism/

http://www.humansandnature.org/the-ethics-of-globalism-nationalism-and-patriotism

(These cover the similar ground, and there is some repetition, but it is nevertheless worth reading both.)

So Remainers are Globalist and Brexiteers are Nationalists, right?

Not exactly, no.

That is far from the full story; it does not explain the motivation of those who can be categorised as "Liberal Leavers", whose manifesto can be found here:

https://www.adamsmith.org/the-liberal-case-for-leave/

So what's going on here? It is quite clear that Liberal Leavers are not Nationalists at all, but are Globalists. They have identified that the EU is itself parochial, just on a larger scale than the nation state, and they want a better form of Internationalism than the EU offers.

Indeed, populism and identity politics are a long way from providing an explanation:

https://capx.co/dont-blame-populism-for-brexit/


As for myself?

I seem to be somewhat straddling both camps. I am a Liberal Leaver, and yet, being an admirer of Edmund Burke, I have sympathies for parochialism.

My real issues, however, with the EU are practical and philosophical, as expounded by Allister Heath:

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/12172429/EU-elites-wrongly-believe-they-have-perfected-government-so-we-should-leave.html

These differences are pretty much the reason why President Charles de Gaulle twice vetoed British entry to the then EEC:

"England in effect is insular, she is maritime, she is linked through her exchanges, her markets, her supply lines to the most diverse and often the most distant countries; she pursues essentially industrial and commercial activities, and only slight agricultural ones. She has in all her doings very marked and very original habits and traditions"

It seems to me that he had it right.

There are also the democratic issues - I agree with both Clement Attlee and Tony Benn, whose views on the Treaty of Rome and the Treaty of Maastricht respectively can be found elsewhere on my blog.

But the thing that really gets my goat is the way that the EU treats countries outside itself:

https://capx.co/how-the-eu-starves-africa-into-submission/

So in summary, my words for the Leave Pot would be:

Coffee and Chocolate.

Clement Attlee on the Treaty of Rome